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Case No. 20080963-SC 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
JACOB B. LOVELESS, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to the new matters raised in respondent's brief. 
A. Section 77-8a-l does not authorize the trial court to accept a guilty 
plea to an alternative lesser offense over the objection of the 
prosecutor. 
Defendant contends that under section 77-8a-l, Utah Code Annotated, the 
State may charge multiple counts in a single information only if " 'each offense is 
a separate count/" Resp. Brf. at 10 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l)). 
According to Defendant, the language of section 77-8a-l suggests "a clear intent 
that specific conduct constituting an offense be separated into separate counts of 
the information." Resp. Brf. at 10. Defendant concludes that if the State files 
multiple charges in one count, " disposition of one or the other offenses alleged 
would preclude further prosecution of the other alternative charge." Resp. Brf. 
at 11. This argument lacks merit. 
Section 77-8a-l identifies the conditions under which multiple offenses 
may be charged in one information or indictment: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be 
charged in the same indictment or information if each offense is a 
separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(a) (West 2004). As long ago explained by this Court, 
"[t]he purpose of [the joinder] statute is to allow joinder of offenses and thus 
eliminate multiple prosecutions to conserve time and effort when justice can 
best be served thereby." State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325,1328 (Utah 1979). The 
statute does not prohibit charging alternative offenses within a single count. 
The language providing that each offense be charged in "a separate 
count" ensures against the vices of duplicitous charges. If two offenses are 
charged in one count, a jury may be unable to convict the defendant for one 
crime and acquit on the other, or the jury may convict on the single count 
without reaching a unanimous verdict on either offense. See 1 Charles A. 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 142 (3d ed. 2002). None of those 
concerns are present where, as here, the offenses are charged in the alternative. 
- ? . 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the charging in one count of the 
alternative offenses in this case violated the rule of duplicity and was thus not 
permitted under section 77-8a-l, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to 
accept Defendant's guilty plea to the lesser offense over the State's objection. As 
observed by this court fifteen years ago, "[djuplicity need not be fatal to a 
prosecution." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,58 (Utah 1993). Duplicity "is a rule 
of pleading rather than substance." Id. Accordingly, assuming the information 
was defective, the flaw "may be cured by such devices as election of charges, a 
bill of particulars, or jury instructions." Id. Where the State charged the two 
offenses in the alternative, the appropriate and expected course of action would 
be for the trial court to instruct the jury "to consider the [aggravated assault] 
charge first and to consider the alternative [reckless endangerment] charge only 
if they did not reach a unanimous verdict of guilty on the [aggravated assault] 
charge." Id.1 
An election of offenses by the State (by amending the information) is not 
appropriate because the charges are not repugnant to each other. See discussion, 
Pet. Brf. at 9. A bill of particulars was also not necessary, where Defendant was 
sufficiently apprised of the date and nature of the offenses through the 
information, the probable cause statement, and the preliminary hearing. See 
Germonto, 868 P.2d at 58. 
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B. A defendant's mere acceptance of responsibility for a lesser 
offense does not bar prosecution of the greater offense. 
Defendant argues that when the State files charges in the alternative, 
nothing bars him from accepting responsibility for the lesser offense. Resp. Brf. 
at 12-16. This much is true. However, in doing so, he cannot thereby prevent 
prosecution of the greater offense charged in the information. This is the 
teaching of Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), and State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188 
(Utah App. 1988). See Pet. Brf. at 12-16.2 It matters not whether the offenses are 
charged in the conjunctive or disjunctive. In either case, the State is entitled to a 
"judicial determination" of the allegations made, as set forth in the information. 
See Pet. Brf. at 6-9. 
Defendant contends that the court of appeals' decision in State v. Montoya, 
910 P.2d 441 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), is inconsistent 
with Johnson. Resp. Brf. at 16-17. He recites the procedural history of Montoya, 
but does not explain why the case "seem[s] to conflict with the [proposition] that 
[a challenged] plea to an alternative charge does not terminate the prosecution." 
Resp. Brf. at 17. He cannot. Montoya recognizes that "the State can charge 
2
 Defendant contends that the State did not raise Johnson in the court of 
appeals below. Aplt. Brf. at 15. This is not true. Although the State did not cite 
Johnson in its brief, it supplied the case to counsel and the court of appeals after 
Defendant filed his reply brief and discussed it in oral argument. In any event, 
Johnson is simply additional authority supporting the proposition that a 
defendant cannot plead guilty to a lesser offense to avoid conviction on the 
greater. 
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offenses in the alternative'7 so long as they do not constitute repugnant theories. 
Montoya, 910 P.2d at 443.3 Nowhere does Montoya suggest that by doing so, the 
State gives up its right to a judicial determination of the greater offense. 
Montoya's guilty plea to the lesser offense was pursuant a conditional guilty 
plea, which requires the approval of the prosecution. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (j). 
Moreover, the procedure followed by the trial court in Montoya is 
instructive. In that case, the State originally charged Defendant with aggravated 
sexual assault, a first degree felony, and incest, a third degree felony. State v. 
Montoya, 887 P.2d 857,857-58 (Utah 1994). When Montoya moved for an order 
requiring the State to elect which charge it intended to proceed on, the trial court 
granted the State leave to amend the information "to plead [incest] in the 
alternative to aggravated sexual assault/' Id. at 858 (emphasis added). Such an 
approach is better than permitting the case to proceed to trial on both charges 
and relying on the merger doctrine to satisfy any resulting double jeopardy 
concerns. Cf. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243. 
C. Whether Defendant is guilty of aggravated assault or reckless 
endangerment is not Defendant's choice to make. 
Defendant contends that the State does not have "the veto power over 
[his] choice of a plea." Resp. Brf. at 19. He reasons that "[w]here there is a 
Defendant has not alleged that the alternative charges are repugnant. 
See Resp. Brf. 
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choice between two alternative offenses in a single count of an information, a 
defendant's right is to choose either/7 Resp. Brf. at 20. The choice, however, is 
not Defendant's to make. It is the choice of the judicially appointed fact finder. 
See Pet. Brf. at 6-9. Where there remains a plea of not guilty, the matter must 
"forthwith be set for trial/7 unless, of course, the prosecution agrees to dismiss 
the other charged offense. Utah R. Crim. P. ll(d),(h). 
D. The prosecutor did not violate Defendant's due process right to 
fairness by amending the information to charge aggravated 
assault or, in the alternative, reckless endangerment. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's motive for amending the original 
information to include the alternative charge of aggravated assault was a 
violation of his due process right to fairness and provides a "further reason" for 
finding that the trial court would not abuse its discretion in accepting his guilty 
plea over the State's objection. Resp. Brf. at 21-25. This argument lacks merit. 
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor violated rule 3.8 of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that "the prosecutor shall . . . 
'[r]efrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported 
by probable cause/" Resp. Brf. at 22 (quoting Utah R. Pro. Cond. 3.8(a)). 
Defendant's contention is unsupported by the record. The magistrate found 
probable cause to bind Defendant over to stand trial on both alternative charges, 
and the trial court thereafter denied Defendant's motion to quash the bindover 
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order. R. 45-44, 77-72. Defendant did not appeal the trial court's order, nor has 
he otherwise challenged the facts supporting the probable cause finding in his 
brief on certiorari. See Resp. Brf. 21-25. Defendant's claim thus fails. 
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor's amended filing was an 
improper use of prosecutorial power to "harass" him, in violation of due process 
as explained in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Resp. Brf. at22-23. The 
question in Brickey, however, was whether a prosecutor could refile charges 
once dismissed for failure to show probable cause. In contrast, and as noted, the 
magistrate in this case bound Defendant over on the alternative charges after 
finding probable cause, and the trial court denied a subsequent challenge to that 
decision in a motion to quash the bindover. R. 45-44, 77-72. "In our system, so 
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed 
an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and 
what charge to file . .., generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkirclier v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). That discretion violates due process only if the 
prosecutor's charging decision "'was . . . deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" 
Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962)). 
It is true that a prosecutor may not "retaliate] against the accused for 
lawfully attacking his conviction" by thereafter charging a more serious offense. 
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Id. at 363 (emphasis added). That is a very different situation than what is 
presented here. In this case, Defendant had been convicted of nothing. Even 
assuming, arguendo, the prosecutor threatened to amend the information to 
include the aggravated assault alternative if Defendant insisted on going to trial, 
such plea negotiation would not violate due process. As observed in 
Bordenkircher, "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element 
of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the 
prosecution's offer." Id. at 363. That would be the case here. "While 
confronting [Defendant] with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may 
have a 'discouraging effect on [Defendant's] assertion of his trial rights, the 
imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'— and permissible — 
'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the 
negotiation of pleas.'" Id. at 364 (quoting Clwffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 
(1973)). 
Defendant also criticizes the prosecutor for telling the court that he could 
not provide a factual basis for the plea of reckless endangerment, because the 
facts the prosecution alleged supported an aggravated assault conviction. Resp. 
Brf. at 25. Defendant misconstrues the import of the statement made by the 
prosecutor, who was contesting Defendant's attempt to plead to the lesser 
alternative charge. See R. 476. The prosecutor's only point was that the State 
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maintained that the facts supported aggravated assault, rather than reckless 
endangerment. That position did not suggest that a jury could not find 
otherwise, based on its review of the evidence, including any elicited by the 
defense. There was nothing improper about the prosecutor's position. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted June 8, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
' S. GRAY 
Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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